(Jury in.)

MR. ROBERTSON:

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THE COURT: All right, Mr. Robertson.

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afternoon. This afternoon I'd like to address some of the arguments that were made by Lawson's counsel with respect to

Thank you, Your Honor.

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some of his non-infringement opinions, and then we'll get to

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the invalidity positions.

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It's just important to remember at all times on these

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arguments on invalidity that it's Lawson that bears the burden

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of proof to you by clear and convincing evidence that these

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patents are invalid.

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First, I'd like to go back to what Mr. McDonald ended with with respect to his argument that no one from Lawson ever

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testified that there were catalogs in this item master or that

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they were published by a vendor and said the only person who

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made that representation to you in this courtroom was Dr.

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Weaver.

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Now, I think what you need do so, if that's the case,

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you need to put aside all the Lawson documents that talk about

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documents that showed you how they can load entire catalogs,

how you load vendor catalogs, you need to put aside those

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and those were their words in their own documents, that that's

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what their system had the capability of doing.

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But right before we broke for lunch, there was some

testimony shown of Mr. Christopherson. You will remember
Mr. Christopherson was the large fellow who is the corporate
representative who was here for most of trial, although he's
not here today. They put up the question and answer, and the
question -- this was Ms. Stoll-DeBell asking Mr.
Christopherson -- using the definition the Court just gave for
published by a vendor, is the customer's item master database
ever published by a vendor?

Answer: If you looked at the entire --

And then the Court interposed and said, I think the answer is yes or no to start with, and then if she wants you to explain it, she can, but the jury will understand your opinion better if you preface it by giving them the guidepost from which to make the assessment if there's any further explanation

And the witness answered no, and that's what Mr.

McDonald read to you, and that's where he stopped. But the

questioning went on, and he didn't show you what he said after

that.

she asks you for. Yes or no?

The Court: Do you want to ask him to explain that? Yes.

Question: Please explain your answer.

Answer: Sure. Looking at the screen that we were just talking about, item number, a vendor could not have published that because they never had access to it. That's

from the customer. Tracked, that's another one where the vendors would love to have the customers have everything in stock. That comes at a cost to the customer, and they don't want to do that. They may have items that are low turnover, they only use maybe once or twice a year. There's other fields that are in the item master. We talked about some of them, you know, catalog number, the vendor's part number or its number, the manufacturer number. Clearly those came from the -- the manufacturer, came from the manufacturer, and the vendor number came from the vendor, and those were in their catalogs at some point in time. The description generally --

And then the Court asked the question, those did come from a vendor?

Witness: What did come from --

The Court: Those that you just testified to --

Witness: Did come from the vendor, but --

The Court: So they were published by a vendor.

Mr. Christopherson: Those particular items, right.

So Mr. Christopherson did testify that the items identified by the Court in its definition of a catalog indeed did come from the vendor for the published catalogs.

If I could just talk now a little bit about, some of these arguments about, other arguments about published by a vendor. One of the arguments has been made that when using the Lawson system, you can only have a textual description of up to

30 characters. I think you heard that several times through several of the witnesses. I would urge you to look at the Court's construction when it talks about the textual description of the item. It doesn't say it has to have any limitation on the number of characters that can be used to describe the item.

It doesn't say, for example, that the customer, when it gets information from a vendor -- I think we heard from Mr. Yuhasz who dealt with medical equipment that when he gets a description that says syringe and they abbreviate it to s-y-r, that doesn't make it any less a description. They certainly understand what they're entering there when they put that description that they obtained from a vendor in the used abbreviations. Using abbreviations or using only 32 characters to describe the item doesn't take it outside of the Court's definition.

In addition, the argument that the item master is not a published catalog has no relevance to this case. The item master is not what's published. It's the information that comes from the vendor that is published and then downloaded into the item master is what's important, and that's how the Court's construction clearly reads.

In fact, when there was questioning about whether the item master itself was being published, repeatedly the Court sustained objections with regard to those questions.

Let me talk a little bit now, if I can, about the validity of these patents at issue. One of the things that was argued was that the RIMS system, for example, was in the public or on sale or the TV/2 system was in the public or on sale. I would respectfully submit to you that there was no evidence as to what the system they are describing was that was in the public domain.

The only thing we have with respect to the RIMS system was that which is disclosed in the '989 patent and which you will have before you and which you can look at it when you deliberate. The only thing we had with respect to the TV/2 product were those two brochures; one, simply an advertising brochure, and another, this general information manual.

We didn't see any RIMS system demonstrated. We didn't see any TV/2 system demonstrated. We didn't see any technical documentation with respect to either of those two so-called systems.

Now, it was the defendant's burden of proof to show you what those functions and features of those systems were. So really, all that can be relied on here, and, indeed, I will show you shortly the only thing that Dr. Shamos relied upon in his opinions was the '989 patent, the TV/2 brochure, and the TV/2 general information system.

Indeed, when I asked Dr. Shamos about the RIMS system, I asked him whether or not it had two catalogs

disclosed. It said, okay, take us to the next element. We were discussing the claim.

Answer: The only claim elements missing from RIMS re at least two catalogs, a collection of catalogs, et cetera.

That was actually in response to Mr. McDonald's question. So Dr. Shamos acknowledges even that RIMS does not have catalogs, an element that's in 11 out of 12 claims that are at issue. You may recall that two of the inventors of this RIMS '989 patent are Mr. Johnson and Mr. Momyer, and they are also inventors on the electronic sourcing patents.

So you would clearly think that Mr. Momyer and Mr. Johnson are in a better position than Dr. Shamos, for example, to tell you the differences between their requisition and inventory management patent and the electronic sourcing patents at issue.

Certainly, as inventors on both of those patents, they are best suited to explain the differences. So what were some of the differences? Remember now, at least four people came in and told you about the differences between the RIMS patent and the patents that are at issue here. They were the three inventors who were all fully involved, and it was Mr. Hilliard.

You will recall that the Fisher RIMS product, its patent described there was a requisition inventory management system. Fisher wanted to be able to take over the management

of its customers' stockrooms and make sure that Fisher supplied their customers with Fisher product. So Fisher would fill its own inventory at a customer's location so it could fill those customers' needs quickly. You will recall that was called just-in-time or JIT inventory. That was the purpose of this RIMS system.

Using it, Fisher had what was known as a customer service representative. You will recall that testimony.

That's a human being right there physically at the customer's location who could then look up an item, but the only way he could do that was using the item number. He didn't have keyword search capability in the RIMS system. There was no question about that.

Using that, that CSR could generate a requisition, but it was a requisition for Fisher product available in the local inventory. If it wasn't available in the local inventory, the RIMS system could communicate over a network back to a mainframe computer at Fisher to transmit a request to transfer the desired testimony based on its item number from one of Fisher's warehouses to the customer location.

Fisher was the only distributor from which the customer could obtain those products using RIMS. That was the whole purpose of the RIMS system, and that's why Fisher Scientific liked it. We want to move and push our product out to our customers.

In contrast, the electronic sourcing system that was a subsequent invention was intended to empower the customer himself or herself. It was to permit that customer to use the product to conduct the end-to-end procurement process. Sitting at their desktop or laptop, they could, in fact, enter keywords, search catalogs, select catalogs, select the matching items, build the requisitions themselves, generate the purchase orders, check the inventory, and do the comparison shopping features. That was the empowerment that was part of the patents, and that's exactly what the infringing Lawson system does as well.

Let's talk a little bit about the differences we can readily discern from the RIMS patents and the electronic sourcing patents. One way to get quickly comfortable with understanding differences is a simple exercise you can do in the jury room.

If we could, let's take a look at the side-by-side abstracts of the invention. Actually, could we switch this first to one of the '683 patents. If you'll look at the cover, this is the cover page of the '683 patent. On the cover page of every one of the patents that are in suit here, there is what's called an abstract.

You'll find there on the '989 patent, which, I believe, is both Defense Exhibit Number 10 and Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 7, you'll find it in there. There's also an

abstract on the '989 RIMS patent, but this abstract, this one from the '683 patent, you will find that this abstract is identical for all three of the patents-in-suit here. It's the same abstract in the '516, it's the same abstract in the '172, and it's the same abstract in the '683.

And so one way to understand the differences, to quickly understand the differences between the RIMS and the electronic sourcing patents is to look at this. So what are the abstracts used for at the Patent Office?

Their regulations say that it enables the Patent

Office and the public generally to determine quickly from a quick review the nature and gist of the technical disclosure of the patent. It is a tool that the examiners use to look at the subject matter and to immediately understand what that invention is directed to.

So let's see how we can compare and contrast these two. I'm not going to go through all these because they are in the jury room, but there are some significant differences. First, just looking at the '989 patent, the first sentence there says, in accordance with the present invention, a requisition and inventory management system is provided. That's what it's being directed to.

Going down a little bit further, it says, the computers there can build and transmit to the other computer communication blocks of data relating to a particular

requisition of an item in just-in-time inventory. You will recall that's what Mr. Johnson and Mr. Momyer said were the Fisher products that they wanted to supply to the customer.

The other computer that's part of this system can then use the received data to process the requisition or to update the just-in-time inventory records. Again, we're talking about Fisher product there.

You'll note down here that these requisition records are created from a realtime interaction between these two computers from information -- I'm skipping down now -- entered by a customer service representative. That's the CSR operating at the local computer. That's at the customer's site.

So the system of the present invention, it goes on to say, utilizes means for automatically determining items in the just-in-time inventory that are likely to require replenishment. Again, that's what's talking about a Fisher product.

So this system then proposes a purchase and transfer order for an optimum quantity of that item, the Fisher item, which the CSR may accept or modify. So what is significant about that? Nowhere in that entire abstract is there ever even any reference to a catalog, never mind multiple catalogs.

Nowhere is there any reference to a system that can be used by a customer. Instead, it refers to the CSRs operating that local computer just as the inventors testified. And the items

that are requisitioned from the just-in-time inventory are the Fisher products. They are not products that are able to be purchased for multiple vendors.

And it's important to remember, even when we're looking at the '989 patent, that the inventors testified that many of the features and functionality that are actually disclosed and described in the '989 patent were never actually even commercially utilized. For example, Mr. Momyer, one of the inventors of both the RIMS and the electronic sourcing patent, was asked the question, what you are saying is you did describe some things for a RIMS system in April of 1993 -- that was the year of the patent application for RIMS -- in the patent application that weren't actually implemented yet in the RIMS system that was on the market; is that right? That's correct.

So then we really don't know what the features and functionality of this RIMS system were that the defendants are relying on and they need to show you by clear and convincing evidence were present. But I'm going to show you in a minute that even if we rely on the RIMS patent itself, it doesn't provide all the functions and features of the patents-in-suit, and it's their burden to demonstrate to you by clear and convincing evidence, on an element-by-element basis for all 12 claims that it's present in the prior art that they're going to rely on.

Take a look just a minute at the abstract of the patents that are in suit, '683, '516, and the '172 which describe to the Patent Office what the real subject matter of the invention is.

Here, the abstract says it's an electronic sourcing system which includes a computer that maintains a catalog database of data including product information such as product identification and descriptive information relating to catalog items available from vendor product catalogs. Right in the first sentence there, they're telling you what this is.

This is an electronic sourcing system. It has catalogs in it. It has product identification and descriptive information. Compare and contrast that to what the abstract is saying about the RIMS patent. It has a means for building, generating the requisition including at least one requisition item. It has a means for searching the database, for catalog items matching that information and selecting at least one catalog located as a result of that search.

It goes on to say it has text describing those catalog items, images of the items may be viewed. Data identifying those catalog items can be communicated to a requisition building means which generates requisition including entries for items corresponding to the selected catalog items, and significantly, the system checks the availability in one or more inventory locations for desired

catalog items.

So there it's checking multiple vendor catalog availability unlike the RIMS just-in-time inventory check.

Completely different, and as you might appreciate, completely significant in the context of what we're talking about with this invention.

On the one hand, I'm just -- on my own have the capability to replace my Fisher product. On the other hand, the user now is empowered to select multiple catalogs, multiple items, multiple requisitions, purchase orders, and check multiple catalog inventories. So we see we have catalog items here, vendor product catalogs, and inventory from desired catalogs.

So even on the face of the patents themselves, it's readily apparent that these are two entirely separate inventions, and there's certainly no question that the Patent Office knew when they granted the patents that were issued here that the '989 was fully disclosed in it because it was incorporated in there, in the patents fully by reference.

If we could just go to the slide that is at page 65 towards the back. You'll see in each of the patents-in-suit, in the background of the invention, this was read to you several times, but in the patents that are at issue here, that Lawson has accused of infringing, it tells the Patent Office right in the body of the patent about the RIMS patent. It says

one such system is the Fisher Scientific requisition and inventory management system, Fisher RIMS, described in this '989 patent, assigned to Fisher Scientific, and it's incorporated herein by reference.

And if you'll note, if we can go to the slide that is page 66, here I've tried to illustrate for you in the patents-in-suit -- these are the patents that Lawson is accused of infringing -- how many times the RIMS patent is referenced as being disclosed to the Patent Office. There are 59 separate times that the RIMS patent is described and explained as to how it was used and modified to make the inventions that are at issue here.

So is it even possible the patent examiner could not understand the details of the RIMS system when it's fully incorporated in by reference and it's referred to more than 59 times? And, indeed, the Court is going to give you instruction on what incorporated by reference means in the jury instructions.

Just paraphrasing, it basically means the entirety of the '989 patent is considered to be set forth with all of its figures and descriptions and everything about it as if it were set forth just in these same patents-in-suit.

So clearly RIMS is not an electronic sourcing system as the Court has described. It is not a system that can be used by a prospective buyer to locate and find goods to

purchase from different sources, suppliers, or distributors, and that's what the Court has defined an electronic sourcing system to mean. The RIMS system was not even used by a buyer, rather as -- the evidence demonstrates it was used by that CSR of the distributor, Fisher Scientific.

RIMS couldn't be used to locate goods to purchase from multiple different suppliers or vendors. The only distributor from which those goods were procured were through Fisher Scientific. There were no multiple catalogs. As I think I indicated, even Dr. Shamos agrees that the RIMS system didn't have multiple catalogs.

The item records in RIMS were for a local database, and they didn't have vendor source-related information since all the products were obtained from Fisher Scientific. You couldn't select product catalogs in RIMS since they didn't have them. You couldn't search for matching items among selected product catalogs because there were no product catalogs to select.

The only thing you could do in the RIMS system was retrieve an item record from the RIMS part master database by performing an item number lookup. All the inventors testified to that, and Mr. Hilliard testified to that. And the problem was if you didn't know the item number, you couldn't retrieve the item from the -- the record from the database because that was the only way to look it up. There was no search

capability, no keyword search.

Given the fact that you didn't have matching items, you couldn't build requisitions with those matching items from the catalogs, you couldn't generate purchase orders from those requisitions for those catalogs, and you couldn't check inventory of the multiple vendors.

The cross-reference tables that are discussed in the '989 patent were simply to cross-reference a competitor's part number with a Fisher part number so if the customer asked for the competitor part number, Fisher could say, you know what, we have the same product. Corning, for example, I think was one of the examples in the case, might be offering a 50-milliliter beaker that had a specific part number that Fisher was able to learn about, and it created a cross-reference table to say, that corresponds to our 50-milliliter beaker, so if the customer wants this, we can try and sell them our Fisher product.

It had nothing to do with the cross-referencing or comparison shopping that is at issue in these patents. Again, RIMS could not determine the availability of a selected matching item from a catalog in inventory. It could only track the inventory of the Fisher products.

So, let's talk about now this combination that's being alleged that RIMS and TV/2 could be put together in some fashion to come up with the patents-in-suit. Again, let me

just suggest to you that the Patent Office was fully aware of the RIMS -- excuse me, the TV/2 product. If you could just show, I think it's page 67. Here's TV/2 disclosed in the patents-in-suit. I've highlighted it in green. 32 times the inventors told the Patent Office about features and functionality of TV/2 in the same patent and what aspects needed to be modified, what aspects could be included and how we could invent the new useful and nonobvious invention that is the subject of these patents.

If you put them together, there's something like 91 separate references. Certainly the Patent Office understood that these two references, and they were fully aware of them -- if we can cite the face of the patents in which the two brochures are disclosed. You see there that Fisher Scientific actually gave the Patent Office the Technical Viewer/2 general information manual, and this IBM Technical Viewer/2 product information brochure.

Now the argument has been made that these were in the public domain. That may have been the case, that may not have been the case as of August of 1993. There's been no corroboration that they were, in fact, out in the public.

There's been some testimony based on memories that are some 17 or 18 years ago. You might remember Mr. Gounaris says he recalls being at a meeting some 17 years ago where he actually handed someone a brochure or saw someone hand a brochure to a

Fisher Scientific person.

I would just ask you to consider the credibility of that statement; first that he remembers actually being at a meeting then 17 years ago and then he has a specific memory that he either handed it or he saw somebody hand it. You would think if he has a specific memory, he would know whether it was him or somebody else, but is it credible to suggest that someone remembers being at a meeting 17 years ago and handed out a specific document, or was that self-serving testimony from a paid witness by Lawson who wants to have that suggestion become part of the record?

So let's take a look and see if we can identify really what it is Lawson alleges is the prior art. If we can go to slide 61, please.

First we have this '989 patent, as I say, invented by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Momyer and disclosed to the Patent Office, and then we have this TV/2 general information brochure, and we have this TV/2 advertising brochure, all of which the Patent Office has. There's no question about that.

Then there's this Fisher RIMS system which we're really not clear what that is; the RIMS brochure, well, that is going to be in evidence, but you'll see that that's simply an advertising brochure, and there's no argument that's made that the advertising brochure anticipates any of the claims at issue in this case. Then there's this unspecified TV/2 system which

we really don't know what the details of that are. All we have to look at are those two brochures.

Now, you will recall testimony that the RIMS system went through many variations and iterations. For example, Mr. Momyer was asked, let me just stop you there and say, approximately how many iterations or variations did the system go through?

Dozens, if not more than that. The Fisher RIMS system was in existence from 1991 all the way through until I left in 2003, and there were many iterations of that.

Unlike Lawson, Dr. Shamos testified that he didn't rely upon any unspecified RIMS system or unspecified TV/2 system. I asked Dr. Shamos, and you are aware that the RIMS system, starting, perhaps, in the late '80s all the way up through until the year 2000 went through many iterations; correct, many different versions?

Answer: Yes.

Which version are you relying on when you are rendering your opinions?

That described in the '989 patent.

So with respect to the evidence you presented, though, did you present anything outside of the '989 patent to support your opinions?

Answer: Not in this courtroom.

I then asked him, did you point to any other version

or produce any documentation of the technical nature of the RIMS system as being used between 1989 and 2000?

No, I didn't personally because, as I said, I don't have personal knowledge of the RIMS system as distributed.

Well, let me suggest, if Lawson's paid expert didn't have any knowledge of the RIMS system as distributed, how could they possibly rely on some unspecified RIMS system, and how could they possibly ask you to determine what it was if they have no evidence to show, and that, again, was their burden to come forward. They could have made inquiries, they could have subpoenaed Fisher Scientific, they could have tried to gather additional evidence, but they didn't offer it here before you, and Dr. Shamos doesn't even understand what the features and functionality of this unspecified RIMS system was.

I also asked Dr. Shamos about the TV/2 system.

Question: So it's fair to say you don't rely on some actual operating TV/2 system in your report because you never saw it; right? You just have two documents that you are relying on, isn't that right?

Yes.

Asked about those TV/2 brochures, you have no personal knowledge, do you, that either of these documents were ever in the public domain prior to August of 1992, do you?

I have no direct personal knowledge of that.

So, were they publicly disclosed? I don't know.

Perhaps, but is that clear and convincing evidence for you to say that these things were in the public domain when nobody has come forward and proved concretely that's the case? There's been no corroboration.

Ms. Eng testified she thought so, and I actually found her to be a fairly credible witness notwithstanding that she was a Lawson consultant paid by Lawson to testify here. But she was doing all this from memory, and it's memory of events that are 18 years ago without any corroboration, and you'll see that the judge will instruct you as to what is necessary in order to corroborate whether or not something is actually out in the public.

So what are we left with if we can put to the side these unspecified systems of which we have no details? We're left with the '989 patent and the two brochures, all of which, again, there's no question the Patent Office had before them.

So when you consider that Lawson is claiming that they have to prove by clear and convincing evidence, you have to evaluate, among the other factors, each difference between every element of each one of the 12 claimed patents and this alleged combination of prior art.

Let's discuss the TV/2 brochures first. Neither brochure provides technical details of how to build a TV/2 search program such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would make and use that program. Mr. McDonald said, and I

wrote it down when he was making the argument, he said anyone of ordinary skill would understand how to combine these things. I would respectfully suggest to you that Ms. Eng, who was at IBM and who had a computer science background and had years of programming experience, she's probably the kind of person of ordinary skill in the art that we're talking about here, and notwithstanding that she was a paid Lawson witness, you would think if anybody could have combined them like Mr. McDonald has suggested, wouldn't it be her?

Question was asked, you'd agree that this general information manual does not provide enough information for anybody as to how to integrate a TV/2 search engine with electronic catalogs; correct?

It does not. It's just general information.

Remember the that general information manual is the more detailed of the two brochures. The other one is a just an advertising puff piece. If the information manual can't help us, how possibly can that advertising brochure?

And there was also no evidence to substantiate that IBM ever had a commercial version of the TV/2 search program prior to IBM's work on the electronic sourcing system. Ms. Eng acknowledged that as well. Lawson wants to rely on a single bullet point from that marketing brochure as providing some sort of suggestion to combining the two.

However, that single bullet point talks about

possibilities and doesn't give you any details, technical or otherwise, on how you might combine these systems. It doesn't even tell you how to use the search results to build a parts list which could be sent to a parts ordering system. Mr. Hilliard indeed says even if you combine the two systems on an element-by-element basis, the combination would not satisfy all the requirements of any claim.

It's because you are combining a system that can simply check the existing inventory of Fisher product, not multiple vendor products, with a search program that can simply read documents. That doesn't give you the elements of the electronic sourcing system that requires multiple catalogs.

Neither system, it was conceded, was not an electronic sourcing system. Neither system can generate requisitions having line items associated with multiple sources, and neither system can generate purchase orders, multiple purchase orders from a requisition.

As we heard from the inventors and the IBM employees, significant modifications needed to be made to both the RIMS and TV/2 system to render them useful for the electronic sourcing system patents.

By now, I've know you've seen repeatedly that statement of work between IBM where Fisher contracted them and paid them more than \$600,000 to work with them in a year and a half to make all those modifications. I asked Ms. Eng about

all the modifications that needed to be made to the TV/2 product in order for it to be adapted to the electronic sourcing product, and she testified at length. You may recall the inventors were asked what they needed to do. One of the things that was important was that an interface for the RIMS system had to be created.

Mr. Johnson said, did you have that interface in RIMS system, or did it have to be created?

No, that was not in the RIMS system. That had to be created.

In addition, he was asked other questions concerning the project in order to result in the inventions at issue here. In modifying this requisition coding, did it also address any issues involving the purchase orders from these requisitions?

Answer: Yes. The system would then create that, would then take that requisition and, by vendor, create multiple purchase orders with the products associated to that vendor.

In addition, there needed to be modifications for connections to outside vendor databases, because that was never in the RIMS system, in order to determine the availability of selected items, inventors' inventory. You needed to add a new cross-reference table that would enable you to convert a selected matching requisition of one vendor to a comparable item to a different vendor, none of which was present in the

RIMS system.

So the question, you also, I think, mentioned that you had to modify requisition coding; is that correct?

Answer: The RIMS system could only communication to the Fisher mainframe, Fisher being Fisher Scientific. We changed those programs to add multiple products from different vendors to a single requisition.

So Ms. Eng, Mr. Kinross, Mr. Momyer described those numerous modifications that were made to the TV/2 viewer document, viewer search program including there was tagging catalog data so the search program could be made to look in the proper places to find the relevant information about catalog items.

And building order list capability, building an index to facilitate searches of large items of data, all of these, you will see when you retire to the jury room, are outlined in that Gantt chart that took more than a year and a half to complete those tasks.

Mr. Momyer testified, did you understand, was there any limitation on the TV/2 system ability to communicate with the RIMS system regarding multiple catalogs from multiple vendors?

Answer: Well, my understanding, I didn't think the TV/2 system, as it was presented to us, could handle multiple catalogs and could not search multiple catalogs. That was my

understanding. That's the reason we did the development that we did.

Now, Dr. Shamos wants to suggest these modifications were trivial tasks easily accomplished with no information other than that which would be found in those two brochures, but the actual facts from the inventors' testimony, Ms. Eng's testimony, and the IBM documentation all speak otherwise.

So let's talk a little bit about some of the witnesses that came here, if we can, that Lawson presented. First, there was Ms. O'Loughlin. You may recall that she was the in-house counsel at Fisher Scientific, and they played her videotape. She was the one who was responsible for filing a trademark application, that Fisher advertising brochure on the RIMS product. It was suggested that there was a lot of arguing over the date of that brochure.

When that brochure came up, I stipulated that it was attached to that April 1993 trademark application and that it at least had to be in the public domain as of that date. I didn't quibble with that, but the fact is, if you look at that brochure, it doesn't tell you what RIMS system was there. In fact, the inventors said many of the things that were in that advertising piece actually never were part of the RIMS system.

And now, there's not a single anticipation argument made with respect to that, but what did Ms. O'Loughlin, a lawyer, not an engineer, candidly admit about the features and

functionality of the RIMS system? Question was asked, how many iterations did the Fisher RIMS system go through?

I don't know.

Do you know how the features and functionality changed during the period of time from 1992 to 1995, for example?

I do not.

You were asked about this entry italicized computer order entry system. Do you see that?

I do. That was in the, one of the brochures.

Can you tell me where in this paragraph it discusses the capabilities of searching multiple vendor catalogs?

I don't see it there.

She was also asked about the annual reports that Mr. McDonald referenced. I asked her, does it discuss in there any other catalog other than the Fisher catalog, and you'll see when you look at those annual reports, that the only catalog that's ever discussed is the Fisher catalog consistent with, in fact, the testimony of the inventors and the disclosure in the '989 patent itself.

Lawson also called Richard Lawson in, the founder of the company, very nice man. He talked about the early years of Lawson. He lives in Dallas. His company operates out of St. Paul, Minnesota. He testified he hasn't been involved in the products that are issue here for over the last five or six

years. He didn't really -- I didn't really understand that he had much relevance to contribute, but Lawson is entitled to call whoever they wanted to call, but he candidly admitted that since 2003, when the products at issue were at issue here, he has not been involved in any of the development of the products at issue in this case.

Question: So it's fair to say you haven't been involved in the day-to-day operations of the company for quite some time; is that right?

Since it went public. I have been retired for five years.

So with respect to those products, did you have some role in developing those products?

Well, since 2003, the answer is, since I left, the answer, that would be basically no.

Pamela Eng was asked a question about what she disclosed with respect to TV/2, in particular the application programming interface. Slide 56, please, Mike. Did you ever give the TV/2 API to anybody else besides Fisher?

Not that I know of, no.

And the API is necessary for this project; right?

If you want to integrate it with another system.

Lawson also called Mr. Charles Gounaris. You will remember Mr. Gounaris was the gentleman who testified that he's made tens of thousands of dollars as a professional witness in

these ePlus cases testifying on behalf of infringers.

Surprisingly, Mr. Gounaris didn't really contribute much of anything. Ms. Eng, when asked about Mr. Gounaris, said, he was a fellow in sales, wasn't he? He didn't work in Manassas where the project was going on.

I don't think he contributed much of anything or certainly didn't contradict anything that Ms. Eng had to say.

So let me say in closing, I do want to come back, and you've been importuned a number of times on this issue about using common sense, which, of course, we all need to do. This case has certainly been challenging and complex on the technology. I confess candidly I don't fully understand all the aspects of these inventions. I was not a computer scientist in college, but I can tell you one thing that's not another or two things aren't the same, and I have every confidence that you can do so yourselves.

So I just would like to put out some questions, if I could, that you should think about or ask you respectfully to think about during your deliberations. Why, for example, would Fisher Scientific go out and commit the kind of resources it did, its people, its money, its time, to build a new system, this electronic sourcing system, if it already had that invention in RIMS? Why would they commit four of their employees, Mr. Melly, Mr. Momyer, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Kinross, the latter two full time, to a two-year project in research and

development if they already had the invention right in their backyard?

Why would they go out and contract with IBM and pay them \$600,000 and spend that year and a half in order to build an electronic sourcing system incorporating a completely revamped TV/2 program, itself which had to go through substantial revisions and modifications, in order to come up with an invention they already had?

Why would Fisher hire several patent attorneys and pay them to prepare patent applications with the Patent Office for an invention they had already patented? Why would Fisher Scientific pursue those patents for nine years paying the Patent Office application fee after application fee after application fee and continue to pay the patent attorneys for that nine-year period to obtain an invention they already had?

Why would the inventors spend two years of their lives trying to develop an invention they already invented?

Who would do that? You saw those inventors. They were proud of their invention. They truly believe they had invented something new and novel, nonobvious, and not the RIMS system.

You might remember, I asked Dr. Shamos why someone would go all through this and pay IBM that money, and his cynical response was, it was just because IBM wanted to make the money. Do you think that's really why Fisher did this or IBM?

Would the inventors have had the pride they had in their invention if they had only reinvented the same wheel? I don't think so. So don't take their inventions away from them, and don't take ePlus's patents away from them on the basis of this infringer's arguments.

Lawson is simply looking to escape the consequences of its own actions, and to do that they ask for your help.

That is why they ask you to invalidate a patent that's presumed valid, and the thin evidence they've presented here falls far short of their significant burden.

I'm not going to walk you through that verdict form that Mr. McDonald mentioned. I think it is going to be relatively clear on its face, but we would respectfully ask that when its comes to the five configurations at issue in the specific claims that are involved, that ePlus has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson's system infringes those claims, and we'd ask you to check yes.

With respect to the invalidity allegations, you're going to be asked a number of questions with respect to whether claims are anticipated or rendered obvious. I would respectfully ask, and I believe that the evidence shows, that Lawson hasn't met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that any of these patent claims are invalid as either being anticipated or obvious, so I respectfully ask that each of these boxes should be checked no.

You are also going to be asked if you do find that a claim is invalidated to specify the prior art that would be relied on. If you do not find it invalid, you need not include any prior art reference alleged by Lawson to invalidate those claims.

So I thank you for your time, and we thank you for your public service.

THE COURT: May I see counsel for a moment.

(Discussion at sidebar as follows:)

THE COURT: You say, and then you have to fill in the blank in section C, which is obviousness, which prior art are you relying on. There you should put in, just put in RIMS plus TV/2 system.

Now, as I see it, that changes significantly your whole theory of what it is that is prior art that constitutes obviousness, because you are telling them what they need to do is put in RIMS system plus TV/2 system. Did I --

MR. McDONALD: I think I might have said it that way. I meant to say at least instead. At least put in those two, but I did not read that into those two things. I misspoke.

THE COURT: They can't do that under the evidence.

In the first place, your expert didn't even rely on those. He relied on other things, so I'm not even sure it's proper for

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any of it to go to the jury anyway, but I think they'll figure it out, but if you don't include the '989 patent in the obviousness, you're dead. So you say you made an error. MR. McDONALD: That's right. THE COURT: All right. I think what they have to do is to say if they have one, they have to specify it's the '989 plus TV/2 brochure, '989 plus TV/2 whatever. I mean whatever the combo is, they have to say exactly what they find and only what they find. MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, I think the verdict form is going to be clear on its face. THE COURT: It is. I think it is, but his statement was at odds with the verdict form. I just want to make sure I'm not giving the jury contradictory messages, and I didn't feel free to tell them you were wrong without consulting you. MR. McDONALD: Is that something you are going to correct, or do you want me to? THE COURT: I'm going to have to correct it. MR. ROBERTSON: I would not want undue emphasize placed on the verdict forms, and the instructions spell out what alleged prior art they can consider. THE COURT: If I do it wrong, object, and you can object if you want to if I don't do it right, I foul it up, but the jury is entitled to know what they really have to do.

MR. ROBERTSON: I'd be loath to object to the Court's

instruction at this critical juncture.

THE COURT: You can object to it, and if you want to, you can come up here and do it quietly. There's nothing wrong with objecting to what Courts do. That's what the lawyers get paid for. You just have to be right so you can prevail.

MR. ROBERTSON: That's right.

(End of sidebar discussion.)

THE COURT: My instructions are going to take about 45 minutes or an hour. What I think we'll do is probably go to a logical breaking point and give you a little break in between. Does anybody need a break now before we start? Okay.

These instructions are something that you're going to have back in the jury room with you, and you can read them.

Nonetheless, I think it's helpful for us to have time together for me to present them to you, and that's why -- and over the years, it's been shown that that is helpful, and that's why I will be doing some reading to you.

In most cases, I know all the instructions pretty well by heart, having done this for a long time, but as you have learned, the patent law issues are very technical, and so I need to be accurate, and I'll be probably reading a little bit more than I usually do.

If you find that my reading tends to put you to

sleep, you let me know and we'll stand up and take a stretch break, because I do know that, in fact, that is a phenomenon that can happen, and I charge you, if you are drifting off, let me know. That's the time for us to take a break, and we'll go from there.

I promise you I won't be the least bit offended, because I know you have the toughest, most important job of anybody in this courtroom. These lawyers have worked very hard, and they've done a great job trying to make the case for their respective clients and put together a case that you could understand out of some very difficult issues, and now you have to -- now you have to do your duty.

And now that you've heard the evidence and the arguments, it's my duty to give you the instructions on the law that you are to follow in the case, and it's your duty as the jurors to follow the law as it's stated here and then apply the law to the facts in the case.

The lawyers properly have referred to some of the law in their arguments, and it's okay for them to do that, but if there's any difference between what you heard them say and what you hear the Court say, obviously you're to be guided by what the Court's instructions say, not that I suggest that they misstated anything, and if they did, I don't believe that either one would have done it deliberately, but sometimes when you are talking and you are doing what they were doing, you say

things that aren't exactly right and without meaning to. So if there's any contradiction, you follow what the Court says.

You are not to single out any one instruction as stating the law, because they are all intended to work together to help you do your job. Nor are you to be concerned with the wisdom of the rules of law, because it would be a violation of your sworn duty and your oath to apply any view of the law other than the law as you are given here, just as it would be a violation of your duty to decide the case on anything other than the facts that are produced here.

Because you are the judges of the facts and you keep in mind that justice through trial by jury always depends on the willingness of each juror individually to seek the truth from the facts and the facts from the same evidence that's been presented to you all and to give -- and to apply the same law.

You are to perform this duty without bias or prejudice to either party, because the law doesn't permit juries to be governed by sympathy or prejudice or public opinion. Indeed, the parties and the public expect that you'll carefully and impartially consider all the evidence in the case, follow the law as stated by the Court, and reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.

The case is between two corporations, and you should realize that the case is to be decided by you as persons of equal standing in the community, of equal worth and holding the

same or similar stations in life. And the corporations are entitled to the same fair trial at your hands as would a private individual be. They stand equal before the law and are to be dealt with as equals in a court of justice.

Now, there's nothing particularly different in the way that a jury should consider the evidence in a trial from that in which any reasonable and careful person would treat any very important question that has to be decided by facts and listening to facts and evidence and opinion, and, therefore, you are expected to use your good common sense.

The lawyers both said it, and I will reiterate it.

In considering and evaluating the evidence for the purposes for which it's been admitted and to give the evidence -- you're permitted to give the evidence a reasonable and a fair construction in light of your common knowledge of the natural inclinations and tendencies of human beings.

I told you earlier and I remind you now, it's the sworn obligation of the lawyer to object if the lawyer feels like the other side is offering evidence that's not in keeping with rulings of the Court, rulings of evidentiary principles, or rules of procedure, and that's how they get a ruling in our system. So don't be upset with a lawyer or his or her client because an objection was made by him or her, and don't be influenced because one side lost the objection and the other side prevailed, because I'm just applying the Rules of Evidence

and the rules of procedure to objections that have been made and not taking sides in the case, and it's the duty of the Court to admonish an attorney who, out of zeal for his or her cause, does something that the Court feels is not in keeping with the Rules of Evidence or rules of procedure.

You, of course, are to draw absolutely no inference against the side, that is the client, to whom an admonition of the Court for a lawyer may have been addressed during the trial of the case.

I've asked some questions in the case. Don't assume that I hold an opinion on the matters to which my questions related. The Court can simply ask questions to clarify a matter, not to help one side or hurt the other.

Remember that the evidence consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses regardless of who called them, the documents that have been admitted into evidence regardless of who offered them into evidence, and all of the facts that have been stipulated, and there's a written stipulation in the case, and you'll have that, and those facts which have been stipulated means the lawyers and the clients on both sides have agreed, and you are obligated, unless something -- I tell you otherwise to accept the stipulation as evidence and regard the stipulated facts as proved.

Remember what I told you at the beginning, that the opening statements, the closing arguments, the questions, and

objections of counsel, the questions of the Court, are not evidence in the case. Any evidence as to which an objection was sustained and which I told you to disregard is not evidence in the case, and we expect that you'll disregard that in making your deliberations.

Remember that anything you've seen or heard outside the courtroom isn't evidence, and you are to disregard it. So you are to consider, therefore, only the evidence in the case, but when you are doing that, you're not limited to just the bald statements of the witness or what appears in the documents, because you are permitted to draw from the facts which you find have been proved any reasonable inferences as you feel are justified in the light of experience, and an inference is just a logical deduction or conclusion that reason and common sense lead you to draw from the evidence that's been received.

Remember there are two types of evidence in the case that I told you about earlier. There's direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. I explained that earlier, and I tell you now the law doesn't make any distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. You are to consider it all. Nor does circumstantial evidence have to be of any better quality than direct evidence. You consider every bit of it.

One doesn't require more certainty than the others, because you can consider both direct and circumstantial

evidence. Now, corporations here are involved as parties in the case, and, of course, corporations can act only through natural people such as you and me as the agents or employees, and in general any agent or employee of a corporation may bind the corporation by his acts and declarations made while acting within the scope of the authority delegated to the employee or the agent and within the scope of those duties.

Now, the lawyers have made references to facts in their arguments, and I have, on occasion, made references to some of the testimony and facts in ruling on things here, on objections that is. If any reference to a fact that is made by the Court or by the lawyers doesn't coincide with your own recollection, remember, it is your recollection that controls, not what they say and not what I say, because you are the judges of the facts.

I told you earlier, too, that you are going to be judging the credibility of witnesses. That just means who do you believe and how much of what they have to say do you believe. You bring to that skill the talent that you exercise in everyday life. There isn't a day that goes by that somebody doesn't tell you something that you have to decide whether you are going to believe or not.

Well, you probably do everything I'm going to mention now, but if you don't, keep in mind that this is what you need to do when you are assessing the credibility of the witness:

Scrutinize the testimony that's given. Consider the circumstances under which each witness has testified. Consider every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief or not. Consider each witness's intelligence, motive, and state of mind and demeanor, the way they act, and manner while on the stand. Somebody tells you something, you look at them, you listen to them, and you judge by the way they act in part whether what they are saying is right or not.

You can do that here, too. Consider what the witness's ability was to have observed the matters as to which he or she has testified and whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate recollection of the matters. Consider also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case. Consider the manner in which the witness might be affected by the verdict and the extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case, because you are to consider all the evidence.

Remember that inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness or between the testimony of different witnesses may or may not cause you, the jury, to discredit such testimony, but remember this: When two or more people witness an incident or transaction, they just simply may see it or hear it differently, and innocent mis-recollection, like failure of

recollection, isn't an uncommon experience. And so in weighing the effect of some discrepancy, always consider, does that discrepancy pertain to a matter of importance or to some unimportant detail? And does that discrepancy result from innocent error or from deliberate falsehood?

After making your own judgment, you're going to give the testimony of each witness such credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves. That is up to you to do.

Something came up during the trial that I need to sort out for you. Several days ago, Mr. Christopherson testified, and there was some testimony about whether Lawson obtained an opinion of counsel of non-infringement or invalidity on the patents. I instruct you now that I have excluded that testimony. That issue is simply not pertinent to the case. It has nothing to do with the case, and I'm instructing you to disregard whatever was said about the intention or nonintention of counsel by Lawson.

Now, several times during the trial, the lawyers have pulled out depositions and have asked a witness a question and said, on such and such a date, didn't you say this after the witness has said something here in court.

A deposition is a sworn statement made out of court but under oath, but the testimony of a witness can be discredited or impeached by showing that a witness made statements earlier which are different or are inconsistent with

what the witness testified to in court.

So if I come to court and I testify that a traffic light was red, and that's my testimony, but at some earlier time I've been deposed or I've written down something, and I said the light was green, you can consider what I said before in evaluating what I said here in deciding which is it that you should accept. There'll be lots of reasons why maybe people give inconsistent statements, and you'll just have to sort that out.

Now, this earlier inconsistent or contradictory statement of a witness who is not a party -- that would be Ms. Eng -- who are the nonparties who testified? Actually Ms. Eng is a consultant, isn't she?

Mr. Yuhasz, let's say that that was Mr. Yuhasz who said the green light, red light, all right? Well, in his case, the only reason you can consider that outside testimony is to decide whether to believe what he said in here, that is you say, well, he said something inconsistent, so I'm not sure I want to believe him, or it was inconsistent, but it's not a big deal, so I'm going to go ahead and accept what he said in court even though he did say something inconsistent. In other words, you can use it to evaluate his credibility.

It's your responsibility to do that. Now, where a party in the case, by -- and that's a corporation by its witnesses, admits some fact or facts, then if that's knowingly

done, that can be considered as well -- that is in the previous statement, as evidence of the truth of the fact as well as for judging the credibility.

So if Mr. Christopherson said green when, in fact, he testified to red here in court, you can consider the fact he said it was green for two purposes: One, whether it was green or not; two, whether it was right when he said it was here -- when he said what he said here which is red, that is to consider his credibility.

Now, there have been certain demonstratives. In fact, there have been a lot of demonstrative exhibits shown to you in the course of the trial. Those are sometimes referred to as demonstrative exhibits, and they are used for convenience and to help explain the facts of the case to you, but they are not themselves evidence or proof of any facts, and, therefore, when you go back to the jury room, you're not going to have the demonstratives. You're going to have the actual exhibits from which the demonstratives were made.

We're going to deal with expert opinions. Expert opinions -- usually the rules of evidence don't let people give opinions in cases, but in the case of someone who is an expert, that rule changes and the expert can give opinion, and Dr. Weaver and Dr. Shamos -- is it -- Dr. Shamos, yes, both of them. Mr. Hilliard, all were experts, and they gave opinions. And they are entitled to do that.

An expert is someone who, by education or experience, may have become knowledgeable in some technical or scientific or specialized area, and if that knowledge can help you in understanding some of the evidence or in determining a fact, then that witness can state his opinion, but remember, what they said are their opinions. That was their view of things. They didn't always say, well, it's my opinion that, but as a basic proposition, everything that they testified to was opinion.

And you can consider opinions received into evidence, and you can give the opinions such weight as you think it deserves, but you should consider the testimony of an expert witness just like you should consider other evidence in the case, and if you should decide that the opinion of the expert witness is not based on enough education or enough experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons that the expert gave in support of the opinion isn't good or sufficient to support it, or if you should conclude that the opinions of one expert is outweighed by all the other evidence or by the opinion or by other evidence or by the opinion of another expert, then you can disregard the expert's opinion in whole or in part, because that's -- you are the judges of the facts, and you can consider that opinion.

Now, also lay people can give opinions, and I believe it was Mr. Christopherson who this applied to. I may be wrong,

but I believe I'm right. He can give an opinion on something if it's based on his or her personal knowledge and is rationally based on his or her perception of something.

So if you find that an opinion given by a nonexpert witness is based on personal knowledge and is rationally based on his perception or her perception of the events, you can consider, you can give it such weight as you want to give it. That's up to you.

Now, we've had a discussion here up to date of sort of the general framework and rules that you apply sort of in doing the job you're going to have to go do. We're now going to turn to the issues that you have to decide, and I'm going to give you instructions on those.

You have to decide whether ePlus has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson has infringed directly or indirectly claims three, 26, 28, or 29 of the '683 patent, whether Lawson has proved -- Lawson has proved by clear and convincing evidence that those same claims are invalid either for anticipation or obviousness, whether ePlus has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson has directly or indirectly infringed claims one, two, six, nine, 21, 22, or 29 of the '516 patent, whether Lawson has proved by clear and convincing evidence that claims one, two, six, nine, 21, 22, or 29 of that patent are invalid, and whether ePlus has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson has

directly or indirectly infringed claim one of the '172 patent and whether Lawson, in turn, has proved by clear and convincing evidence that that claim is invalid.

Now, there are different kinds -- you've got those claims in your book, and people have referred to them throughout the trial. There are different kinds of claims at issue in the case. There are system claims and method claims. All claims, whether they are system or method, contain elements or requirements sometimes that people have referred to them as, or the elements or limitations on the claims.

The system claims in this case are claim three of the '683 patent, claims one, two, six, nine, 21, 22, and 29 of the '516 patent, and claim one of the '172 patent. And to infringe a system claim, an accused system has to contain each of the elements in that particular claim, and you know what the elements are.

They are small little paragraphs that follow the introductory language, the prefaces that say an electronic system comprising, or a system, et cetera, or a method, et cetera, and then it contains specific things that have to be done to be within the reach, protective reach of the claim, and if an accused system contains each of those elements, then it infringes. If it doesn't, then it doesn't.

In fact, if it doesn't -- if, say, the claim has six elements, if you find that it contains five of the elements but

doesn't contain the sixth, then it doesn't infringe, so it has to have them all.

There also are method claims, and those, in this case, are claims 26, 28, and 29 of the '683 patent, and that method claim recites a series of steps that have to be performed, and to infringe a method claim, it must be proved that use of an accused system performs each of the steps as defined in the claim, and, again, they have to prove all of it. If they only prove one out of five, then that's not enough. If they prove five out of six, that's not enough.

Now, you've also heard some evidence from the experts about independent and dependent claims. An independent claim simply recites its own elements or steps and does not refer to any other claim. A dependent claim includes all the elements or steps of another claim, that is the claim from which it depends, plus one or more other elements or steps.

So it will say a system comprising or a method comprising or method for doing this as recited in claim one which also, or that also does, and that's a dependent claim because it recites the claim that it comes from.

A dependent claim, of course, is infringed only if all elements or the steps of the independent claim, as well as the other element listed in the dependent claim, are shown to exist in an accused system or method. So in other words, to prove infringement of the dependent claim, you have to prove,

A, that all of the elements of the claim from which it depends are infringed and the one which is new as well. Now, the dependent claims at issue in this case are claim 29 of the '683 patent, and claims two, six, and 22 of the '516 patent.

These instructions are numbered. If you need to know that, all of this is recited for you in instruction number 17 so you can identify, but you can also tell by the language they use as well.

And all of the other claims here are independent claims. The claims here, all of them actually, whether they are system claims or method claims, use the term comprising. Comprising simply means including but not limited to or contain. Thus, claims that contain the word comprising cover any accused system or method that includes the elements of the claims even if that accused method or system includes additional functionality or steps.

What is important is whether the accused system or method of a claim using the term comprising includes all the elements of the claim. If it does, then infringement is proved even if the accused system or method includes even more functionality or features.

Now, to decide the issues of infringement and invalidity, you're going to need to understand the claims of the patents because as both lawyers, I think, have pointed out and was in the video before, the claims define the boundaries

of the rights that ePlus has in its patents, that anybody has in their patents.

Now, those instructions -- I mean those patents are in your notebook, and each of the claims that are at issue are highlighted in yellow, and I've defined the claim terms, and you have to use those terms, and they are in your notebook as well, and you use those same definitions in deciding both infringement and invalidity. And the definitions are those as would be given and are understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, and you've heard people talking about.

One of the few things that I think the parties agreed upon in this case is who was the person of ordinary skill in the art, and that is someone in the field of computer science with an undergraduate Bachelor of Science degree and some practical programming experience, perhaps about a year or two, and having an understanding of the basic principles of supply chain management and procurement during the 1993 to mid 1994 time frame.

If the Court has not given you a definition, then the words of a claim are to be given their usual and ordinary meanings. The parts of the patent that precede the claim are called the abstract, and I believe somebody pointed that out to you -- that has some evidentiary value, of course, because it tells you things -- and the written description or specification, but neither the written description nor the

abstract nor the drawings, which are called figures, can be infringed. The infringement is of the claims, not the things that precede the claims, and that's what you are looking at.

The term published by a vendor was used, and I'll remind you of that definition. I think they read it, and you probably have it perfectly in mind now, but published by a vendor is used in the definition of the claim term catalog/product catalog.

Published simply means to make generally known.

Published by a vendor simply means that at some point in time,
a vendor, such as a supplier, a manufacturer, or a distributor,
has made generally known or has disclosed an organized

collection of items and associated information, preferably but
not necessarily including the part number, price, catalog

number, vendor name, vendor ID, a textual description of the
items, and images of or relating to the item.

Now, two of the claims here contain what is referred to as means for performing a stated function in the elements, and you've got those interpreted in your book as well. Claim three of the '683 patent and claim one of the '172 patent have elements that also include the means plus function requirements.

That term, means for, has a special meaning in patent law. One example is that claim three of the '683 patent uses the phrase means for selecting the product catalogs to search.

When it uses that term, means to do something, it's called a means plus a function.

Here, the means is recited, and then the function is to do something. What is the function, to search, in the example that I just gave you? A means plus function element covers a structure or a set of structures that perform the particular function that is outlined, and that is either identical or equivalent to at least one of the structures described in the patent for performing that function.

The issue of whether two structures are identical or equivalent is for you to decide. I've identified the structures described in the patents, and they are in your juror's notebooks as are the functions.

All right, now, let's discuss for a moment how a claim defines what it covers. You probably have this in mind pretty well, but I think I better just make it clear. A claim I said has a preface. That's that beginning thing. You'll notice that in these claims, at some point before that highlighting occurs and after all that verbiage occurs and I'm going to use the '683 patent as an example, you have many, many pages in there of description in the specification and the abstract, and then on column 24, right under appendix X, it says we claim, and it is from that point that the claim, i.e., the boundaries of the invention become defined.

The first one of these claims that you have to worry

about is claim three, and it's highlighted for you, and it's an electronic sourcing system comprising, and then it has the elements set forth below it. That's what you are looking at.

Each element is then stated in a single sentence, and if an accused system or method satisfies each of these requirements, then it's covered by the claim. In other words, what does covered by the claim mean? It means it infringes the claim. So if an accused system, and you've got the list of them, you'll have them right in here in your verdict form, and you'll remember that Dr. Weaver, when Mr. Robertson was talking to him and asked him questions, defined which of the five systems he thought infringed which, each of the claims, and you'll have that identified in your verdict form for you to look at.

So that means that -- let's just say configuration one, and I don't know if this is right or not, but if they say configuration one infringes only claim one of the -- claim three of the '683 patent, then that's all you have to decide, but if they say it infringes every one of them, the claims, then you have to decide that, too, and that's all outlined for you on your verdict form as well.

So let's talk just briefly about infringement generally. Patent law gives the owner of a valid patent the right to exclude others from importing, making, using, offering to sell, or selling the patented invention or product made by a

patented method within the United States during the term of the patent. Any person or business entity that has engaged in any of those acts, that is importing, making, using, offering to sell, or selling, et cetera, that I just read, without the patent owner's permission infringes the patent.

The parties here agree that ePlus has not given any such permission to Lawson. Here, ePlus alleges that Lawson's accused system and methods directly and indirectly infringe the yellow highlighted claims in your juror notebook for each the '683, '516, and '172.

The verdict form asks you to determine whether ePlus has shown by a preponderance of the evidence whether any of Lawson's accused system or methods infringe, either directly or indirectly, the asserted claims of those three patents. ePlus has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the issue of infringement. What does that mean?

Preponderance of the evidence simply means to prove that something is more likely so than it is not so, or in other words, a preponderance of the evidence in the case means such evidence, as when considered and compared with the opposing evidence, has a more convincing force for you and produces in your minds belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than it is not true.

I don't mean in singling out numbers here for you to tell you where that is, but the parties emphasized these

burdens so much in our arguments, the lawyers did, if you need to refresh your memory on what preponderance means for ePlus and what clear convincing means for invalidity for Lawson, you can look at 23. That's for infringement. Invalidity is dealt with in another thing. I'll tell you what that is later.

Now, infringement, of course, has to be based, as you know and you've learned, on a claim-by-claim basis so that there may be infringement of one claim and not another. That's something you're going to have to decide.

Now, when you are deciding infringement, you must only compare Lawson's accused systems and methods to the claims of the ePlus patents. In deciding the issue of infringement, you may not compare Lawson's accused systems and methods to ePlus's commercial products and methods. You don't compare product to product. You do the system that's accused, whether it's a system or a method, against the claims of the patent. So whether or not Lawson's products that they sell and ePlus's products are the same or different is not a matter that you get into.

A patent can be infringed directly or indirectly.

Direct infringement occurs if the accused system or method is covered by one or more or all of the claims in the patent.

Direct infringement of a method claim results if a single actor performs all of the steps of that claim.

What's indirect infringement? Indirect infringement

results if the defendant, here, Lawson, induces another to infringe a patent or contributes to the infringement of a patent by another person. I'm going to explain those two types of infringement now.

Lawson would be liable for directly infringing ePlus's patents if you find that ePlus has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson itself has made, used, offered to sell, sold, or imported into the United States the invention defined in any claim of the patents. Then that claim has been infringed if they proved that by a preponderance of the evidence.

Now, remember that someone can directly infringe a patent without knowing that what they are doing is an infringement of the patent. You don't have to know you are infringing the patent to infringe it. You either do or you don't. So you can directly infringe a patent even though you believe in good faith that what you are doing is not an infringement of the patent.

The issue is does it or doesn't it, not what state of mind the direct infringer had. In every infringement analysis, the language of the claims as well as the nature of the accused system or method dictates whether infringement has occurred. To infringe a claim that recites capability and not actual operation, an accused system or method need only be capable of operating in the described mode. Thus, depending on the

claims, an accused system or method may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of satisfying the claim elements or limitations even though the system or method may also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation. The fact that a product or process may operate in a manner that does not infringe is not a defense to a claim of infringement against Lawson if its system is also reasonably capable of operating in a manner that satisfies the claim elements.

Now, Lawson -- I mean ePlus also alleges that Lawson has actively induced other people to infringe the patents-in-suit. In particular, who are they alleged to have induced? The Lawson customers in this case. That's what it's about.

To show induced infringement, ePlus has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that someone, here, Lawson's customers, have directly infringed the ePlus patents, and that Lawson -- so they have to show that the customers directly infringe. And remember, it doesn't make any difference whether the customers knew or didn't know that they were infringing, because if you infringe, you infringe whether you know it or not. But they also, ePlus has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson has actively and knowingly aided and abetted that direct infringement.

So here, in order to find that Lawson has induced somebody else to infringe, you do have to consider Lawson's

state of mind, i.e., that they actively and knowingly aided and abetted the indirect infringement by their customers. ePlus, thus, must show that Lawson actually intended to cause the acts that constitute infringement and that Lawson knew of the patent and that Lawson knew or should have known that its actions would lead to actual infringement.

Knowledge of the patent may be established by a finding that Lawson had actual knowledge of the patent or that Lawson deliberately disregarded a known risk that ePlus had a protective patent. Intent to cause the acts that constitute direct infringement may be demonstrated by evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement such as advertising an infringing use or instructing someone on how to engage in the infringing use.

It is not necessary to show that Lawson has directly infringed as long as you find that someone, here the Lawson customers, directly infringed and that Lawson did the things that I said constituted inducement. If there's no direct infringement by anyone, there can be no induced infringement, and, of course, induced infringement must also be assessed on a claim-by-claim basis.

Now, just to review that, what you're going to have to do here is look and see if Lawson's systems, all or any of them, actually infringed the patent when they were used by the customers of Lawson. Then you have to decide whether Lawson

actively and knowingly helped -- that's called aiding and abetting -- the direct infringement, and there was evidence that you have to decide about who was involved in talking to the customers, what they told the customers. You consider all of that as well, but remember that in order to prove by -- I mean to prove induced infringement, ePlus has to show that Lawson actually intended to cause the acts -- and I'm reviewing this little part of the instructions -- that constitute infringement, that Lawson knew of the patent and that Lawson knew or should have known that its actions would lead to actual infringement. Pay attention to the rest of that instruction as well, but I wanted to recapitulate for you that.

Now, there's another kind of indirect infringement that's involved, and that's called contributory infringement. ePlus also argues that Lawson is liable for this contributory infringement by contributing to the direct infringement of ePlus by third parties, again, the Lawson customers.

As with direct infringement, you have to determine contributory infringement on a claim-by-claim basis. Lawson is liable for contributory infringement of a claim if ePlus proves by a preponderance of the evidence, one, that Lawson sells, offers to sells, or imports within the United States a component of a Lawson system or apparatus for use in a process during the time the patent is in force.

I don't think there's any issue here, is there, about

the time frame? If there were infringing sales, is there an issue about the patent being enforced? I don't remember any evidence about it, and I'm trying to take it out of the case.

Mr. Robertson, Mr. McDonald, was there any evidence adduced to that point?

MR. McDONALD: I don't think that's an issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, I don't think it's an issue here, either. Do you?

MR. ROBERTSON: No, sir.

THE COURT: While I told you about that during the time the patent is enforced, there's no issue as to that. You still have to be comfortable with that. Two, that the component or apparatus has no substantial non-infringing use; three, that the component or apparatus constitutes a material part of the invention of the ePlus patent; and four, that Lawson is aware of the ePlus patent and knows that the system for which the component or apparatus has no other substantial use may be covered by a claim of the ePlus patent, and that the use of this apparatus or component directly infringes the claim by -- and that direct infringement here would, of course, be the person who they are alleged to be contributing to infringe the patent, and that would be the Lawson customers. That is the use by Lawson customers directly infringes the claim.

It is not necessary to show that Lawson has directly

infringed as long as you find that someone, here, the customers, has directly infringed, but if there's no direct infringement by anybody, then there can be no contributory infringement, and, of course, this has to be assessed on a claim-by-claim basis as well.

And now we'll turn to these means-plus-function claims in claim three of the '683 and claim one of the '172 patent, and those definitions are set out for you on the second through fourth pages of your juror notebook glossary of claim terms.

A product or a process meets a means-plus-function requirement of a claim. Again, look at the claim language and look at it element by element. So it meets -- a process or product meets a means-plus-function element of a claim if, one, it has a structure that is the product or process -- here, has a structure or a set of structures that perform the identical function that is recited in the claim, and, two, the structure or set of structures is either identical or equivalent to one or more of the described sets of structures that I've given for you and performing the functions that are recited.

If the product does not perform the specific function recited in the claim, then the means-plus-function requirement is not met, and the product does not literally infringe the claim.

Alternatively, even if the product has a structure or

set of structures that perform the functions recited in the claim, but the structure or set of structures that performs the function is either not identical or not equivalent to one or more of the structures or sets of structures that I have defined for you, then the product does not literally infringe the asserted claim.

A structure or a set of structures may be found to be equivalent to one of the sets of structures I have found, and that's -- if you'll look at your notebook and look at your terms, you will see that there is -- for each one of these means-plus-function things, it says, means for building requisition that uses data from said database relating to selected matching items on set order list. Boy, that's a mouthful, isn't it?

There's a function described, and then there's a corresponding structure. Now, we're talking about -- now, what does it take for some structure to be equivalent to what I have defined? Well, it's equivalent if a person, having ordinary skill in the art or in the field, would have considered the differences between what I have described and what actually happens to be insubstantial at the time the patent issued if that person would have found the structures performed the function in substantially the same way to accomplish substantially the same result.

In deciding whether the differences would be

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insubstantial, you may consider whether a person having ordinary skill -- ordinary level of skill in the field of technology of the patents would have known of the interchangeability of the two structures or sets of structures.

Interchangeability itself is not enough in order for the structures to be considered interchangeable. interchangeability of the structures must have been known to persons of ordinary skill in the art at the time the patent issued. That's August of 1994.

The fact that a structure or set of structures is known now and is equivalent is not enough. The structure or set of structures must also have been available at the time the patent issued.

All right, we're through now talking about infringement. We're going to move to the invalidity defense, but you've been sitting here for awhile. Would you like to take a little rest before we go there? We'll take about a 15-, 20-minute break and then come back and do invalidity.

(Jury out.)

THE COURT: Will you tell me who testified to interchangeability and equivalency for purposes of contributory infringement? As I was going through that -- I'm not sure we had evidence. If you did, it went right by me. Who did it?

1 MR. ROBERTSON: It's for the means-plus-function 2 claims, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Yes, I know that. 4 MR. ROBERTSON: Dr. Weaver was talking about the 5 various programs that perform that functionality during his testimony. I mean, I think that's -- quite frankly, the 6 7 structures disclosed in your construction show that there are 8 various types of programs that can actually perform that 9 functionality. 10 THE COURT: But what he didn't say was he didn't 11 address interchangeability or equivalency on that pint. 12 MR. ROBERTSON: It's not a doctrine of equivalents 13 concept, Your Honor. THE COURT: I understand that, but it still uses the 14 word and the term. I think it is one of the dumbest concepts 15 16 of patent law, to tell you the truth, and I think that you have to have an expert actually come in and say what it is so a jury 17 18 can understand it, and I'm not sure we have it in this case. It is a very difficult concept for any juror to grasp 19 without the aid of expert testimony, and I don't think we ever 20 21 did it. Why didn't -- you must have thought he did it, because you didn't get up and say anything or object to the 22 instruction, so you must think I'm one of the dumbest --23 24 MR. McDONALD: It was part of our JMOL when we were

saying go claim by claim and element by element doing the

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necessary analysis --

THE COURT: Well, no. You said he didn't go claim by claim and he didn't do it the right way. You didn't get into the fact that he didn't offer the opinion on structural interchangeability.

MR. McDONALD: What we said was he gave only conclusory opinions and failed to do the analysis necessary, and that is exactly the sort of analysis --

THE COURT: I know you made those statements, but you didn't put it out in terms of contributory infringement.

MR. McDONALD: Or this is actually the means plus function clauses, but it was certainly meant to encompass those.

Just to be clear, our motion for JMOL did include those means-plus-function elements, and specifically that Dr. Weaver's conclusory --

THE COURT: I don't mean contributory infringement.

I mean means plus function.

MR. ROBERTSON: I think Dr. Weaver testified when we went through all those manuals exactly what the programs were that were performing that functionality.

Remember, these are computer programs, so we went through the purchase order manual, we went through the inventory control manual. He was testifying based on that.

Quite frankly, I think he was saying that the claims were

literally satisfied based on the Court's construction. 2 THE COURT: I know that's what -- I agree he did 3 that. The question is, having done that and having no evidence 4 on the issue of any interchangeability, why is that a good 5 instruction? 6 MR. ROBERTSON: As I'm standing here right now, I 7 don't specifically recall whether or not he said there can be 8 programs outside this that are disclosed, that are not disclosed in this purchase order manual, but I don't think he 9 10 did it with respect to every single one, but I don't have 11 memory respect to every single. He certainly did do it with respect to the Court's construction. 12 13 THE COURT: I know that. I know he did that. Не said specifically this does this function, this is the 14 15 structure that does this function. All right. Well, it's done now. We'll take a 16 17 recess. 18 19 (Recess taken.) 20 21 22 23 24 25